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Getting to the Truth 
GROUNDING INCOMPLETE KNOWLEDGE 
Frank C. Keil† 
One aspect of truth concerns knowing when to trust 
others when one’s own knowledge is inadequate. This is an 
ever more common problem in societies where technological 
and scientific change seems to be constantly accelerating. 
There is an increasing need to rely on the expertise of others 
and consequently to know when others are more likely to be 
offering an objective opinion as opposed to a biased one. Here, I 
argue that there are systematic and early emerging cognitive 
heuristics and biases that profoundly influence our patterns of 
deference, our ways of assessing expertise, and our sense of 
when testimony is to be trusted. For the most part, the power 
and pervasiveness of these biases are ignored or greatly under-
appreciated. These biases and heuristics can both mislead and 
inform our understanding and use of others’ expertise; it is 
therefore critical that we acknowledge their presence and know 
how to work with them. 
As will be seen shortly, people tend to make serious 
mistakes in their evaluations of both their own knowledge  
and the complexity of systems. Even worse, when people do 
recognize that their understanding is inadequate, they can 
make surprising mistakes in guessing who the right expert is 
to fill out the details. In other cases, however, adults and even 
young children can accurately figure out where appropriate 
expertise lies. The details of this story, as described later in 
this paper, are central to any full account of how we know 
when to trust others. We have many tools that can be used to 
help decide when it is appropriate to defer to another’s area of 
expertise and when it is better to have serious doubts; 
unfortunately, we often do not use these tools effectively.  
  
 † Professor of Psychology and Linguistics and Master of Morse College at 
Yale University. Much of the research described in this paper was funded by NIH 
grant- R37- HD023922 to Frank Keil. 
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   The issue of establishing trust will be considered in a 
series of five sections. Part I will explore the problem of 
unbounded causal complexity, namely, the need for ways to 
construct explanatory gists of causal systems that are far too 
complex for any one person to fully understand. Part II will ask 
about the ability to assess the quality of one’s own knowledge 
and will argue that there is a strong tendency for people to 
overestimate the depth and quality of their explanatory 
understanding of a wide range of devices and natural pheno-
mena. Part III will consider a related phenomenon in which 
people are shown to have misleading illusions of insight  
when explanations are supplemented with certain kinds of 
irrelevant, but nonetheless compelling, support. Part IV will 
suggest that illusions of explanatory depth and illusions of 
insight may be related to errors in underestimating just how 
complicated various phenomena are, especially those related to 
the social sciences. Part V will consider how people manage to 
get by with incomplete knowledge, suggesting that there are 
several cognitive tools and heuristics that are used to help fill 
in the gaps in one’s own knowledge. Finally, Part VI will 
discuss how all these factors converge to explain how people 
are able to establish trust and what errors are likely to occur. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF UNBOUNDED CAUSAL COMPLEXITY 
Virtually any phenomenon in the natural or artificial 
world has seemingly unbounded levels of causal complexity. 
Ask a simple question, such as what stem cells are and how 
they work, and the answer can be expanded on in ever deeper 
and more complex ways. Stem cells may initially be described 
as cells that have the potential to become any one of the many 
cell types within an organism. A request for more detail  
may reveal broad classes of cell types that can be created (for 
example, ectodermal, mesodermal, or endodermal). Deeper 
answers can reveal ever more fine-grained descriptions of the 
different cell types. Still deeper answers reveal how all these 
cell types are related in a hierarchical structure. All of this 
information can then be elaborated on in enormous detail with 
respect to the signaling mechanisms that cause cells to 
differentiate in one manner as opposed to another, mechanisms 
that can involve intricate accounts of molecular pathways that 
regulate various sets of genes. If one is driven to gain the 
deepest explanation possible, one gradually gets exposed to 
much of developmental biology and molecular biology, as well 
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as areas of chemistry, physics, and even other more distant 
fields. 
The same holds for questions about the world of human 
inventions, such as how helicopters fly, how drugs influence the 
body, or how a resolution of patent dispute might influence the 
economies of several nations. In all such cases it is quickly 
apparent that no one person can possibly know the full answer 
to each question. One must know how to seek out legitimate 
experts and how to avoid illegitimate ones. One must also know 
when experts are making a statement within their range of 
competence as opposed to outside that range. All of us have 
huge gaps in our explanatory understandings that we tolerate 
because we think they are firmly grounded in legitimate 
understandings in other minds, understandings on which we 
can rely when necessary. 
These issues are highly salient in the law. The courts, 
for example, frequently allow the testimony of expert 
witnesses, assuming that there are reliable ways to identify 
such experts and use them to improve the quality of legal 
proceedings and decisions. The complexity and distributed 
nature of knowledge requires that we have well-worked-out 
and reliable mechanisms for grasping the division of cognitive 
labor and that we know how to identify appropriate areas of 
expertise and appropriate experts within those areas. In 
addition, we need to know when experts are likely to be more 
or less trustworthy. The cognitive science of such processes is 
critically relevant to evaluating how well such patterns of 
deference, consultation, and trust work; yet it has been largely 
neglected in the law. 
II. HOW WELL DO WE KNOW THAT WE DON’T 
UNDERSTAND? 
To assess how well people deal with causal complexity 
and the need to consult others, one must first know when one is 
in over one’s head. One must have a way of sensing when there 
are gaps in one’s knowledge that make one’s understanding so 
flawed that it is inadequate for use in a task. This problem of 
knowing how little one knows occurs in every facet of life. A 
student may not realize that she does not really understand an 
explanation offered by a teacher; a businessman may not know 
that he has misunderstood a critical clause in a contract; and 
members of a jury may think they understand the details of a 
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complex patent dispute when in fact they have overlooked a 
critical underlying principle. 
Most people are quite inept at estimating how well they 
understand various everyday phenomena, showing a strong 
tendency to assume they understand how the world works in 
far more detail than they really do. We have called this effect 
an “illusion of explanatory depth” (“IOED”).1 The IOED can be 
quickly revealed in tasks where people are taught how to rate 
causal understanding on a scale that ranges from one (virtually 
no understanding beyond a vague sense of what a phenomenon 
appears like) to seven (a full mechanistic understanding of 
exactly how a device works or how a natural phenomenon 
occurs). Even though people can be shown to clearly 
understand the scale and use it correctly when rating sample 
texts of explanations, they give much higher scores than they 
should when asked to estimate their own explanatory 
understandings.  
The effect is the strongest for estimates of one’s causal 
understanding. For example, when people are asked to rate 
how well they think they understand how a helicopter flies, 
they might give a rating of five or six. Yet we can show that 
this rating is far too high by simply asking them to actually 
write out, or verbally report, everything they know about how a 
helicopter flies. After giving the fullest explanation they can, 
people are again asked to rate their knowledge in light of that 
explanation. Their ratings on this second occasion show a 
sharp drop relative to their first ratings, with people routinely 
evincing great surprise at how little they actually knew. 
Matters get worse if they are asked a simple diagnostic 
question (for example, how does a helicopter go from hovering 
to moving forward?) and are then asked to re-rate their 
knowledge in light of their ability, or inability, to answer that 
question. People again show a considerable drop relative to 
their initial rating and even to their second rating. Their 
ratings stay low if they are shown a concise but detailed 
explanation and asked to compare it to their own initial 
understanding and then use that comparison as a basis for 
assigning a score to their initial rating. In other words, people 
consistently rate their initial guesses of how well they 
  
 1 Frank. C. Keil. Folkscience: Coarse Interpretations of a Complex Reality, 7 
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 368, 368 (2003); Leonid Rozenblit & Frank Keil, The 
Misunderstood Limits of Folk Science: An Illusion of Explanatory Depth, 26 COGNITIVE 
SCI. 521, 522 (2002). 
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understood various phenomena as being far too high when 
their real knowledge is put to the test. 
These effects are substantial and happen for ratings of 
understandings of both artifacts, such as helicopters, and 
natural phenomena and systems, such as the workings of the 
heart. In contrast, when asked to rate self-knowledge of facts 
(for example, the capitals of relatively obscure countries) or of 
procedures (such as how to make an international phone call) 
or even of narratives (such as the plot of a well-known movie), 
people tend to be much better calibrated, either being fully 
accurate or overestimating the depth of their knowledge to a 
much lesser extent.2  
The selectivity of the IOED has strong implications for 
drawing conclusions about when a person is likely to be 
accurate or inaccurate with respect to claims about the quality 
of their own knowledge. In some domains that do not require 
much underlying causal structure, assuming that people are 
acting in good faith, they are likely to be quite accurate. In 
others, however, such as ratings of causal explanatory 
understanding, even the most sincere and trustworthy people 
are likely to systematically overestimate what they really 
know. The extent of the IOED can be quite remarkable even for 
extremely common everyday objects. In one series of recent 
studies people were shown sets of simple drawings of bicycles. 
One drawing was correct while others had the chain connected 
to sprockets on both wheels in a manner that would make 
steering impossible or had the chain disconnected from the 
drive wheel. Adults had great difficulty picking out the correct 
drawing from among three incorrect ones, even though they all 
said they were familiar with bicycles and often rode them. They 
showed the same patterns of major errors when shown bicycle 
frames of which only one could functionally work. Even 
members of an active bicycle club made substantial numbers of 
errors.3 The commonplace nature of some devices does not 
assure that people will know how well they understand them. 
Indeed, in at least some cases, high familiarity may breed an 
especially high overconfidence. It may be that when someone 
can easily use something, he or she confuses that sense of ease 
with a sense of causal understanding. 
  
 2 Rozenblit & Keil, supra note 1, at 533. 
 3 Rebecca Lawson, The Science of Cycology: Failures to Understand How 
Everyday Objects Work, 34 MEMORY & COGNITION 1667, 1671 (2006). 
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Experts may also fall prey to the IOED in their highly 
refined areas of expertise. They may be somewhat better 
calibrated,4 but, especially in areas that are at the boundaries 
or “leading edge” of their own understanding, they may 
sincerely believe that their understanding is deeper than it is. 
This seems to be particularly true in cases where experts are 
assessing how well they understand something, as opposed to 
assessing how well they know how to do a procedure. In such 
rarified areas, novices who rely on these experts may have an 
especially difficult time evaluating an expert’s sincere, but 
misguided, claims to having deep explanatory understanding. 
As will be shown, however, even when a layperson is at such a 
disadvantage in the relative size of the knowledge base, there 
still are ways to adjust confidence in an expert’s testimony.  
The IOED holds not only for assessments of one’s 
knowledge, but also for assessments of knowledge in other 
minds. Thus, recent work in our laboratory indicates that 
ratings of how well others understand various phenomena or 
devices are equally likely to be inflated. This has important 
implications for knowing when and to whom one should defer. 
Thus, even if one comes to a realization that one does not 
understand, such a person may systematically overrate the 
likelihood that another person does. The IOED also tends to get 
stronger the less one knows or the younger one is.5 Thus, if a 
person has a very high level of ignorance in an area, that 
person is especially liable to not know when intellectual 
outsourcing, namely, the reliance on others to provide complex 
explanations, is needed.6 The greater extent of the phenomenon 
in children raises questions about how to evaluate their claims 
that they understand the reason for an action or event. 
Similarly, children may be especially vulnerable to knowing 
how well they have understood instructions or explanations 
that are provided to them in a courtroom.  
Across numerous studies, we see several converging 
cognitive mechanisms that seem to set up and maintain an 
  
 4 Rozenblit & Keil, supra note 1, at 554-55. 
 5 Candice M. Mills & Frank C. Keil, Knowing the Limits of One’s 
Understanding: The Development of an Awareness of an Illusion of Explanatory Depth, 
87 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 1, 23-24 (2004); Candice M. Mills & Frank C. 
Keil, The Development of Cynicism, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 385, 389-90(2005).  
 6 See Justin Krueger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of It: How 
Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments, 
77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1121, 1126-30 (1999).  
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especially strong IOED for explanatory understanding.7 People 
tend to confuse higher-level functional glosses on a system 
(such as knowing that turning a key starts a car) with lower-
level mechanistic understanding (such as understanding the 
complex starting circuitry in modern vehicles). They also tend 
to confuse explanations that they are able to piece together in 
an ad hoc manner with pre-stored explanations that they bring 
to a situation, underestimating the degree to which they 
generate explanations “on the fly” as opposed to bringing them 
preformed to a situation. In addition, because people rarely 
give exhaustive explanations, they have little practice in 
evaluating explanations for completeness. These and other 
factors help make the IOED robust and difficult to attenuate. 
III. FALSE EXPLANATORY INSIGHTS 
There is a related cognitive bias to the IOED that 
documents ways in which people can have a false rush of 
explanatory insight when in fact none was actually achieved. 
Certain kinds of information can be associated with 
explanations that make them much more appealing than is 
appropriate. One example with increasing relevance for the law 
is the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging (“fMRI”) 
data to make claims about neural functions, or about 
disruptions in neural function that might arise from various 
forms of brain damage. Many court cases have allowed 
extensive testimony in which fMRI findings are alleged to 
explain why a person behaved as he or she did or why an 
individual clearly has suffered brain damage arising from the 
negligence of others.8 In many cases, fMRI findings might well 
provide useful additional information in legal procedures, but 
in many others they can have a powerful and often 
unrecognized ability to mislead.  
In particular, fMRI results can create a false sense of 
insight when they are in fact completely irrelevant to the 
  
 7 See Frank C. Keil, Explanation and Understanding, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL 
227 (2006); Frank C. Keil, Doubt, Deference and Deliberation: Understanding the 
Division of Cognitive Labor, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY 143, 163-64 
(Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne eds., 2006); Rozenblit & Keil, supra note 1, 
at 552-56.  
 8 See Jennifer Kulynych, Note, Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A High-
Tech Crystal Ball?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1251; Lewine et al., Objective 
Documentation of Traumatic Brain Injury Subsequent to Mild Head Trauma: 
Multimodal Brain Imaging with MEG, SPECT, and MRI, 22 J. HEAD TRAUMA 
REHABILITATION 141 (2007).  
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quality of an explanation in which they are embedded. Thus, it 
can be more difficult to detect weak or flawed research when it 
is accompanied by uninformative fMRI results than it is to 
detect equally weak or flawed research without such results. To 
demonstrate such an effect experimentally, one can present 
adult experimental participants with one of four explanations, 
which are created by varying the explanations along two 
dimensions: whether the explanation is good or empty and 
circular, and whether or not it contains irrelevant fMRI results. 
Student participants clearly preferred the good explanations  
to the empty/circular ones when there were no fMRI results 
accompanying those explanations. In contrast, they found it 
much more difficult to tell the good from the bad explanations 
when they also contained the fMRI results, even though the 
fMRI results were completely noninformative.9 Only highly 
trained experts in cognitive neuroscience showed the same 
abilities to discriminate good from bad explanations when they 
were accompanied by neuroimaging results.10 The neuro-
imaging results were not particularly complicated; however, it 
appeared that phrases such as “brain scans showed that” made 
it much harder for most people to then evaluate that the brain 
scans added no new information. Because the experts were 
easily able to see the good from the bad experiments with the 
neuroimaging results, we know that the neuroimaging really 
did not add any new information of value. 
It seems that we can gain misleading senses of insight 
when studies are made more concrete through such means as 
brain imaging, even when the imaging is irrelevant. In 
deciding whether fMRI results should be admitted into 
evidence, it is critical to carefully look at what additional 
insights they really offer, as opposed to relying on simple 
intuitions that the fMRI supplemented explanations seem 
more “solid.” More broadly, neuroimaging certainly has an 
important role to play in understanding behavior, but the 
potential for abuse needs to recognized.11 When people try to 
understand the many invisible factors leading to behaviors, 
  
 9  Deena Skolnick-Weisberg et al., The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience 
Explanations, J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. (in press). 
 10 Id. 
 11 See generally Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom Evidence: On 
the Admissibility and Persuasiveness of fMRI, 2 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 233 (2006); 
Jennifer Kulynych, Legal and Ethical Issues in Neuroimaging Research: Human 
Subjects Protection, Medical Privacy, and the Public Communication of Research 
Results, 50 BRAIN & COGNITION 345 (2002). 
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such as a criminal act, there is a tendency to seize on any 
claims about how the basis for such behaviors might be 
physically instantiated. It seems likely that comparable effects 
may be found for other alleged physical bases for behavior, 
such as claims that there is “a gene” causing a certain 
behavior. 
In short, people can have rushes of insight as they learn 
more about a phenomenon, but sometimes these rushes do not 
correspond to real increases in understanding. In particular, 
when people are offered information that is phrased in terms  
of a lower, more concrete, level of analysis, they often will take 
that information quite uncritically and think that it adds value 
because it is lower level and not because it actually provides 
any new explanatory information. Laypeople should be 
especially vigilant when provided with explanations that shift 
down levels in some kind of reductionist hierarchy, keeping in 
mind that things often sound better than they really are when 
such a shift occurs. 
IV. DO WE KNOW WHERE COMPLEXITY LIES BENEATH? 
Another problem related to assessing truth concerns 
estimating the complexity of various systems and phenomena. 
Even if people were fairly accurate at sensing the degree of 
comprehensiveness of their own knowledge, they might get into 
considerable trouble because they do not understand the level 
of complexity of a phenomenon; they assume that their 
relatively simple understanding is all that is needed because 
they underestimate the actual complexity of the phenomenon. 
Difficulties here lead directly to problems of trust and 
deference. 
Knowing when we need to defer to another’s expertise is 
intimately related to how complex we think the phenomenon 
being explained is. If the phenomenon seems trivial and 
relatively self-evident to any reasonably observant and 
thoughtful person, then it may be inappropriate to bring in an 
expert who might only muddy the waters rather than shed 
insight. We can all envision such trivial cases. Suppose, for 
example, a defendant drove through a school zone at 100 mph 
and asked for clemency on the grounds that he didn’t know 
that such a high speed posed a risk for school children. It is 
reasonable to argue that there is no need for traffic experts to 
be brought into such a case to testify that the risk level was 
increased. Moreover, it certainly makes sense for the courts to 
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exercise discretion in allowing people to testify as expert 
witnesses. Without such discretion, it is easy to see how the 
introduction of experts could lead to delaying tactics and 
obfuscation in a courtroom. 
Other cases, however, may seem far simpler than they 
really are. In particular, experts on psychological mechanisms 
have often been disallowed in the courts on the grounds the 
expertise is simply “common knowledge” and that the alleged 
expert has nothing to offer that a reasonable layperson does 
not already know. For several decades psychological experts 
have been excluded in cases abroad12 and in the United States. 
One especially prominent recent case concerned the perjury 
accusations against I. “Scooter” Libby. Libby’s defense team 
wanted to bring in experts on memory to testify that it was 
quite plausible that Libby could have misremembered past 
events, rather than deliberately committing perjury.13 Judge 
Reggie B. Walton, however, disallowed such experts partly on 
the grounds that laypeople had accurate and detailed 
understandings of the fallibility of memory; it was not clear 
what additional insights could be added by “experts.”14 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to document the 
many complex features of the human memory system and how 
they can cause behaviors that may surprise the layperson and 
even be quite counterintuitive to lay theories of how memory 
works. To use just one example, many people think that 
memory is laid down almost like a videotape recording that 
may become buried but is always present.15 Such a view grossly 
underestimates the extent to which memories are constantly 
being revised and reconstructed in ways that can completely 
overwrite the earlier version. The public fascination with 
“recovered memories” is one example of this bias. Although 
  
 12 See Andrew M. Colman & R.D. Mackay, Legal Issues Surrounding the 
Admissibility of Expert Psychological and Psychiatric Testimony, in CHILDREN, 
EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE 46 (Noel K. Clark & Geoffrey Stephenson, eds., 1993); R.D. 
Mackay et al., The Admissibility of Expert Psychological and Psychiatric Testimony, in 
ANALYSING WITNESS TESTIMONY: A GUIDE FOR LEGAL PRACTITIONERS AND OTHER 
PROFESSIONALS 321 (Anthony Heaton-Armstrong et al. eds., 1999). 
 13 See Elizabeth F. Loftus & Richard L. Steinberg, Op-Ed., If Memory Serves, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2007, at A14. 
 14 United States v. Libby, 461 F. Supp. 2d 3, 16 (D.D.C. 2006); see also 
Thomas Adcock, ‘Psychology in the Practice of Justice’ Conference Draws Together 
Legal, Science Scholars, 237 N.Y. L.J. 20 (2007). 
 15 Seema L. Clifasefi et al., Setting the Record (or Video Camera) Straight on 
Memory: The Video Camera Model of Memory and Other Memory Myths, in TALL TALES 
ABOUT THE MIND AND BRAIN 60, 60-61 (Sergio Della Sala ed., 2007). 
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laypeople often believe that there exist exact traces of 
memories of childhood experiences that can be brought to light 
with appropriate “excavations” by therapists, the experimental 
evidence for such recoveries is minimal. Putting aside the 
merits of Judge Walton’s decision, the question arises as to 
whether judges might often be prejudiced against the 
possibility of psychological explanations having a complexity 
comparable to that which one might find in areas such as 
biology or physics.  
In adults, it is very difficult to know how to measure the 
relative complexity of two domains, as complexity itself can 
vary in so many ways. For example, if asked whether a full 
explanation of superconductivity or face recognition is more 
complicated, one could easily pick either alternative by 
emphasizing different facets of the phenomena. Perhaps 
superconductivity is more complicated because it requires a 
particular kind of mathematics, or perhaps face recognition is 
more complicated because it requires integration across several 
different forms of mathematics as well as anatomy. Thus, it 
may seem impossible to distinguish between claims that people 
are biased to think of psychology as simpler than other sciences 
and claims that psychology really is simpler. Recently, 
however, studies have been conducted that suggest a cognitive 
bias is at work.16  
These studies rely on the assumption that such biases 
might arise from very basic intuitions that emerge early in 
childhood, intuitions that might gradually become weaker with 
age by compensating knowledge. Thus, there might be a rough 
and ready intuition that psychological phenomena are simpler, 
an intuition that gets tempered with age through experience 
with the complexity of actual psychological situations. To 
examine this possibility, one study took a large number of 
everyday phenomena in domains such as physics, biology and 
psychology. The phenomena were pre-tested to find a subset 
that adults judged as all about equal in complexity. For 
example, the following “why” questions were judged to be 
equally complex: How does a top stay spinning upright? How 
does your skin heal after it has been cut? Why is it hard to 
understand two people talking at once? Children, ranging in 
age from five to fourteen years, were then asked to make 
  
 16 Frank C. Keil, Kristi L. Lockhart & Esther Schlegal A Bump on a Bump?: 
Early Intuitions Concerning the Relative Difficulty of the Sciences (forthcoming).  
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judgments about the complexity of these same selected 
phenomena.17 As the age of children decreased, a stronger bias 
emerged in which psychological phenomena were judged as 
much simpler than those in the biological and physical 
sciences.18 This pattern strongly suggests that the bias may 
persist in adults, but in a reduced form. Moreover, it may re-
emerge in stronger terms in adults when they must also 
evaluate several other complex factors at the same time, such 
as in a legal case. Similarly, this pattern may emerge in time 
pressured situations, rapid verbal exchanges, or under pressing 
questions. Thus, even though the stimuli questions were 
judged by adults to be of equal complexity, the psychological 
ones may actually be more complex, with the difference being 
masked by a latent bias that still persists in a weaker form 
from childhood. It might be possible to show this remaining 
difference in complexity by contrasting detailed expert explana-
tions of psychological and natural science phenomena that are 
judged to be of equal complexity by laypeople. 
Children in these studies often attempted to explain 
their intuitions by referring to the immediacy of psychological 
states. They experienced them automatically and effortlessly, 
and that feeling may be confused with a sense that the 
phenomena are therefore simple. They also often said that 
everyone could understand such phenomena, suggesting 
something quite close to the “common knowledge” claims made 
by judges. Common knowledge may, in fact, not be well 
understood. 
In short, it is not safe to assume that one’s novice 
intuitions about the complexity of phenomena are always 
accurate. There may be systematic biases that heavily distort 
one’s intuitions into thinking some classes of phenomena are 
much simpler than they really are. There is also the possibility 
that other biases may create intuitions of greater complexity 
than is warranted, although such patterns still remain to be 
experimentally demonstrated. One such example might involve 
a system that has a vast number of parts and seems hopelessly 
complex, but which is suddenly rendered very simple when a 
basic repeating pattern is pointed out. Some fractal patterns 
can take on great simplicity when seen in such a light.  
  
 17  Note that all the questions were phrased in very simple terms that would 
be readily understandable to young children. 
 18 Id. 
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It would be extremely useful in legal cases to have a 
greater awareness of complexity biases and to factor them in 
when making decisions about whether to allow certain kinds of 
expert witnesses. It does not follow that all claims of expertise 
should be allowed, or even that all legitimate areas of expertise 
are relevant to the case at hand; but it is evident that we do not 
currently have in place sufficiently rigorous and systematic 
ways of evaluating whether a phenomenon requires testimony 
from experts in order for jurors and judges to act in a more 
informed manner.  
V. GETTING BY WITH LESS 
The story so far seems pretty discouraging. Normal 
adults, as well as attorneys and judges, labor under several 
cognitive biases that could powerfully influence trust and 
deference. They overestimate their own explanatory under-
standing, they get false surges of insight from irrelevant 
sources of seductive information, and they may have heavily 
distorted senses of what phenomena are truly complex and 
require expert assistance and deference to those experts. How 
might these problems be addressed? There are two answers, 
one arising from trying to instill a mindfulness about these 
biases in the legal system, and the other arising from ways in 
which complete novices do have tools at their disposal that 
enable them to evaluate expert claims, even when they 
understand very little about the details of those claims. 
A. Mindfulness 
In the case of mindfulness, legal cases might well be 
helped by a simple awareness not only of the fallibility of our 
knowledge related judgments, but also of the details of how 
those judgments are distorted. All parties in a legal proceeding 
should constantly be asking if they might be systematically 
overestimating not only their own understandings, but also 
those of others. This might entail techniques to carefully 
examine levels of understanding in ways that are thorough 
without being badgering or intimidating. There may be a set of 
heuristics that one could apply before making statements about 
the depth of one’s own understanding or of that held by others. 
For example, one might be required to write out complete 
explanations of some facet of a phenomenon or to answer 
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certain critical diagnostic questions posed by top experts in the 
field.  
Similarly, one should not assume that it is an easy 
matter to ascertain whether an area of expertise is legitimate 
or merely common knowledge. It would be a mistake to clutter 
the courts with an endless parade of experts on every possible 
topic, but it would be an equally large mistake to not try to 
develop explicit sets of procedures for evaluating alleged areas 
of expertise. If, for example, people have a tendency to succumb 
to reductionist explanations, even when they are empty, it 
might be possible to present them with examples of noninfor-
mative reductionist explanations to illustrate common pitfalls. 
Alternatively, one could suggest that people specifically ask 
what value is added when a new piece of information is 
introduced at a different level of analysis; for example, asking 
what predictions the new information now makes possible that 
were previously impossible or more difficult before receiving 
the new information. It is unclear what mindfulness strategies 
may be most effective simply because research in this area is 
relatively new. There is a great deal of cognitive science to be 
done in this area as well, but the knowledge gained so far can 
certainly suggest some guidelines. 
B. Implicit Tools for Evaluating Expertise 
Everyone shares certain heuristics that can be brought 
to bear to assess both the credibility and relevance of experts 
and the appropriateness of judgments, heuristics that have 
roots in early childhood. For example, young school children 
are more likely to doubt the testimony of people whose 
statements are self-serving. Thus, a person who claims to have 
won a close race is more likely to be doubted than one who 
claims to have lost the same race.19 This may seem blindingly 
obvious, but it is not clear how often people are provided with 
adequate information about the potential links between a 
person’s testimony and their own motivational states. For 
example, only recently have several major newspapers adopted 
the practice of disclosing the funding sources behind new 
discoveries in biomedical research. This practice undoubtedly 
was influenced by studies showing, for example, that scientists 
funded by pharmaceutical companies have quite different, and 
  
 19 Mills & Keil, The Development of Cynicism, supra note 5, at 389. 
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usually much more company-self-serving, results than 
scientists funded by government grants. Indeed, drugs have 
been reported as twenty times more effective in supposedly 
objective trials when the studies are funded by drug companies 
as opposed to when they are funded by federal agencies.20 One 
cannot rely on the researchers conducting such studies to 
monitor themselves, as even the most ethical may unknowingly 
introduce bias. Whenever information that has been gathered 
by others is presented, it is important to know how that 
information relates to the motivational states of others. 
A second form of implicit knowledge relative to the 
evaluation of expertise concerns having a sense that a domain 
of knowledge is appropriate for expertise even when one does 
not grasp most of the details of that domain. Here, we can 
consider some forms of implicit knowledge that are very early 
emerging in normal cognitive development and therefore 
should be considered available to virtually all adult jurors. 
There are, in fact, several distinct ways to enhance our 
judgments of the legitimacy of expertise: whether the 
properties being stressed are likely to co-occur in a domain, 
whether a coherent domain is being discussed, whether there 
are signs of deeper causal structure, and whether an 
appropriate gist has been constructed. Each of these ways is 
actively being pursued in research, but there are already 
indications that laypeople also use these to evaluate expertise 
in their everyday lives. 
People will look at which property types are emphasized 
in an explanation to support hunches about whether an avowed 
expert is likely to be making sense. For example, all things 
equal, someone who explains how a novel machine works by 
stressing its color and the precise number of internal parts is 
less likely to be a legitimate expert than one who stresses the 
shape of the machine and the strength or fragility of specific 
parts. In contrast, someone who is trying to explain the nature 
of a novel plant might well focus on color and precise numbers 
of parts of its anatomy.21 Even five-year-olds have some sense of 
this difference and can use it to choose between experts.22 
  
 20 See Lisa A. Bero et al., Factors Associated with Findings of Published 
Trials of Drug-Drug Comparisons: Why Some Statins Appear More Efficacious than 
Others, 4 PLOS MED. 1001, 1006 (2007). 
 21 Frank C. Keil et al., Two Dogmas of Conceptual Empiricism: Implications 
for Hybrid Models of the Structure of Knowledge. 65 COGNITION 137 (1998). 
 22 Id. 
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Similarly, even preschoolers have a sense that it is more 
sensible to talk about the overall function of novel artifacts 
(such as machines and tools) than it is to talk in the same 
manner about novel animals (for example, it makes more sense 
to say what a new tool “is for” than it does for a new mammal). 
Even children may have a sense to doubt expertise that 
spans too diverse or broad areas of knowledge.23 Thus, if one 
person claims to be an expert on ducks and swans, that person 
is more credible as an expert than one who claims to be an 
expert on ducks and lasers. All laypeople, as well as young 
children, share a sense that it is more likely that one will be an 
expert on areas of knowledge that are closer together in some 
taxonomy of knowledge.24 Similarly, even children are sensitive 
to the fact that it is more plausible for someone to be an expert 
on a smaller class of entities at a lower level in a taxonomy (for 
example, all ducks) than it is to be an expert on a larger class 
at a higher level of a taxonomy (for example, all animals).25 
These intuitions require some sense of the division of cognitive 
labor in a person’s community and the idea that knowledge 
clusters can be understood to form a kind of hierarchical 
structure similar to that found in the academic organizational 
charts of universities. Quite surprisingly, children as young as 
five do have some sense of such a structure, which they extract 
by looking at meaningful causal clusters in the world. 
In addition, people can also sense when there are signs 
of deeper causal structure and use those to guess whether one 
is discussing a legitimate area of expertise. It is, for example, 
quite obvious to young children that it makes much more sense 
for there to be an expert on hunting dogs than on dogs with red 
collars. Even though a child may know virtually nothing about 
hunting dogs, he or she seems to engage in causal conjectures 
that reveal a likely causal structure. For example, a child 
might speculate that dogs that hunt would have better vision 
and smell and that an expert might know all about how that 
happened. For dogs with red collars, however, the child would 
see that there were no comparable plausible speculations about 
  
 23 Keil et al., supra note 16. 
 24  Other work shows that children do have some sense of such taxonomies. 
Frank C. Keil et al., Discerning the Division of Cognitive Labor: An Emerging 
Understanding of How Knowledge Is Clustered in Other Minds, COGNITIVE SCI. 
(forthcoming); Judith Danovitch & Frank C. Keil. Should You Ask a Fisherman Or a 
Biologist?: Developmental Shifts in Ways of Clustering Knowledge, 75 CHILD 
DEVELOPMENT 918, 919 (2004). 
 25  Keil et al., supra note 24; Danovitch & Keil, supra note 24, at 927-28. 
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causal generalizations that would follow from having a red 
collar. Thus, even when one does not really understand a 
domain, one can often use simple heuristics, such as causal 
counterfactuals, to get a sense of whether there is likely to be 
causal depth present worthy of expertise. These heuristics are 
not perfect however and can fail when rating the relative 
complexity of physical and psychological phenomena. A better 
understanding is needed of when they can work and when their 
usefulness is more limited. 
Finally, there are indications that people understand 
the difference between reasonable and unreasonable gists of 
complex explanations and can use the difference to evaluate 
experts as well as an area of expertise. They may be able to do 
so without having much understanding at all of the details of 
the explanation. For example, ongoing research in our 
laboratory suggests that people can look at very general 
structural principles of an explanation, such as how some 
details are elaborated on by others, to guess at which is a good 
gist. A good expert should be focusing on core concepts and not 
on peripheral elaborations of a specific point. Someone who 
does not really grasp a domain well may not know enough to 
say much about the core concepts and may try to feign 
expertise by going on about subdetails of one facet of a 
phenomenon. Even laypeople, however, can sense or can be 
trained to sense when this sort of excessive detail is occurring 
and to start questioning expertise. There are some relatively 
simple clues as to when someone is going into irrelevant details 
as a way of trying to cover up ignorance of a central issue, and 
these clues may be available to a wide range of observers with 
quite modest knowledge of the area of alleged expertise. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Human cognition can cause both pitfalls and 
opportunities in our efforts to get at the truth in a causally 
complex world in which deference and trust are essential. The 
pitfalls revolve around the ways in which individuals can be 
quite poor at recognizing their own areas of weak under-
standing. We live under illusions of explanatory depth and we 
have the same illusions about explanatory understanding in 
others. We are further hindered by a tendency to be seduced  
by a sense of false insight when we are presented with certain 
ways of making phenomena more concrete, even when such 
concreteness is nothing more than uninformative fMRI results. 
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We may also introduce systematic distortions into our sense of 
where the deepest causal complexities in the world arise, with 
the result that we tend to underestimate the complexity of 
psychological phenomena relative to most physical ones.  
The opportunities to overcome these predispositions 
arise from the surprisingly sophisticated ways in which all of 
us, even young children, can use our intuitive senses of real 
world causal structure and of the nature and purpose of 
explanations to assess experts even when we have very modest 
knowledge of an area of expertise. We can evaluate experts 
(and judges) in terms of their self-interest. We can also 
evaluate experts in terms of the reasonableness of the avowed 
area of expertise, using such factors as the breadth and depth 
of what they talk about and the ways in which they summarize 
complex bits of information. All of these are quite recent areas 
of research, but every sign is that cognitive science will soon 
tell us a great deal more about both the illusions we labor 
under and should be mindful of and about the ways in which 
we use heuristics and implicit knowledge to have a good sense 
of when and where to place our trust. 
These new developments create a burden for cognitive 
scientists to communicate the current state of this research 
more clearly with those in the law, as well as a burden on those 
in the law to recognize both our cognitive biases and our 
surprising evaluative abilities. At present, we both over-
estimate and underestimate different aspects of people’s 
cognitive capacities, and we do so in ways that may well impair 
the manner in which trust should optimally function in the 
courtroom. 
